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ABSTRACT 
In this comment, I raise questions about belief unctions that are motivated by 
statistical considerations. I suggest hat there are problems with belief unctions in 
statistical inference that need further investigation. I argue that the betting 
paradigm has a status in the foundations of  probability of  a different nature than 
that of  the canonical examples that belief unction theory is built on. In addition 
to using the betting metaphor to make judgments, we use this analogy at a higher 
level to judge the theory as a whole. My contention is that a similar argument 
would make belief functions easier to understand. I question the separation of  
belief from frequency, and ! take the position that it is a virtue of  subjective 
probability that it contains frequency probability as a special case by way of de 
Finetti's theory o f  exchangeability. I briefly mention the notion of  asymptotics in 
belief unctions, and I make a technical remark about convex sets of  probability 
measures. My conclusion is that I agree with Shafer that there are situations where 
belief unctions are appropriate but I feel that the statistically motivated questions 
require more attention. 
KEYWORDS: coherence, lower probabilities, exchangeability, statistical 
inference 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The paper by Shafer under discussion in this special issue is an interesting 
summary of the current state of affairs in the theory of belief functions. Shafer 
has done an admirable job of summarizing both the strengths and limitations of 
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belief functions. I agree with and am intrigued by many of his ideas. His point 
of view that belief functions are not a panacea for problems involving 
uncertainty is refreshingly nondogmatic. Shafer is interested in clarifying the 
situations where belief functions are useful and in ensuring that the calculus of 
belief functions is properly employed. To this end, I would like to elaborate on 
some issues that require further clarification. 
In Section 2, I express ome concern about the difficulties that one encoun- 
ters when using belief functions in statistical inference. I disagree with Shafer's 
claim that the nonuniqueness of belief function inference is similar to the 
nonuniqueness of posterior distributions in Bayesian inference. In Section 3, I 
discuss the notion of coherence, and I suggest hat the betting analogy upon 
which coherence is based deserves a higher status than other canonical 
examples. In Section 4, I argue that frequency and belief should not be 
separated. Instead, frequency should be seen as a special case of belief due to 
de Finetti's theory of exchangeability. Rather than leading to confusion, this 
clarifies the assumptions that are needed to believe in frequencies. In Section 5, 
I ask about the availability of asymptotic results in belief functions. Such 
results have been instrumental in probability theory for investigating the 
behavior of probabilities as information is accumulated. Section 6 makes a 
brief remark that elaborates on Shafer's careful and important warnings about 
the relationship between belief functions and lower probabilities. I conclude 
my remarks in Section 7. 
2. STATISTICAL INFERENCE 
I myself have been interested in how belief functions apply to statistical 
inference (Wasserman [1, 2]), and, like others who have attempted such 
investigations, I have encountered difficulties. Walley [3] and Seidenfeld [4] 
expose the main problem: The theory of belief functions is incompatible with 
the time-tested statistical concept known as sufficiency. 
As a result, belief functions have not fared well in the arena of statistical 
inference. Statistics' brief flirtation with belief functions eems to be dying out. 
This is a bit worrisome. After all, the birthplace of belief functions is in 
statistics (Dempster [5, 6]). And the coded message canonical example bears a 
close resemblance to Fisher's [7-9] fiducial reasoning and so has strong 
statistical roots. The statistics profession consists of a large body of individuals 
who have thought hard about he business of uncertainty for a long time. Their 
reluctance to accept belief functions can be only partly attributed to natural 
skepticism with respect o new and unusual ideas. This rejection should not be 
taken lightly. 
Shafer seems to equate the nonunlqueness of belief function inference to the 
nonuniqueness of posterior distributions in the Bayesian paradigm that results 
from having to choose a prior. I don't think this analogy is accurate. The 
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nonuniqueness in Bayesian inference is not about methods of arriving at 
answers. It is about the particular numbers one uses in a given problem. The 
situation is different for belief functions where even the method to derive the 
answers is in question. There is a clear mapping between the inputs and 
outputs of the Bayesian machine, and I don't think the same can be said about 
belief function inference. One could embrace the viewpoint in Shafer [10] 
and say that with further input--namely, the evidence on which the model is 
based--a particular form of belief function inference would arise. But then, to 
make the status of belief functions as secure as Bayesian methodology, we 
would need a clear mapping between the sets of possible evidence one could 
have as input and the type of belief function inference that is to be used as 
output. 
Shafer attributes ome of the perceived problems to a confusion about belief 
and frequency. I am not convinced that this explains away the problems. I say 
more about this in Section 4. 
Perhaps it is a bit unfair to be concerned about this particular application of 
belief functions. Shafer even claims, " I  . . .  do not think that purely statistical 
problems are the most important domain of application for belief functions." 
But I wonder if this will lead researchers to dismiss difficult problems instead 
of trying to further clarify them. I believe that investigations of belief functions 
in statistics hould not be abandoned but instead should be pursued with vigor. 
For the highly structured setting of statistical inference is a fine testing ground 
for any theory of uncertainty. Until these problems are better understood, 
belief functions will continue to engender suspicion among statisticians. 
3. COHERENCE OR CANONICAL  EXAMPLES 
Shafer [11] developed a theory of constructive probability in which uncer- 
tainty is quantified by comparing a given problem with a scale of canonical 
examples. Belief functions are constructed from a specific class of canonical 
examples. Canonical example can be used in two ways. On the one hand, they 
can help us make judgments within a theory. For example, I can use the idea of 
an urn with a known proportion of white and black balls as a reference 
example to make probability judgments. This idea is akin to Hartigan's theory 
of similarity (Hartigan [12; 13, Sects. 1.10 and 5.5]) and other formulations of 
probability--the roulette lottery of Anscombe and Aumann [14] and the 
auxiliary experiment in DeGroot [15, Sect. 6.3]. On the other hand, Shafer 
uses canonical examples in a stronger sense. He uses those examples to justify 
the theory itself. That is, the examples are used to define and justify the rules 
of belief functions. 
In the foundations of probability, most scholars have used some notion of 
coherence to justify probability; see de Finetti [16], Ramsey [17], Shimony 
[18], and Heath and Sudderth [19]. The basic idea is as follows. Suppose I
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assign a number P(A)  to each event A in an algebra of events ~¢. How can I 
tell if my assignment of numbers makes sense? One way to make such an 
assessment is to see if using these numbers as a basis for action would lead to 
sensible results. In particular, suppose I interpret P (A)  as the price at which I 
would buy or sell tickets that are worth one unit if A is true and worthless 
otherwise. We can say that my numerical assignments are incoherent if there 
exists a finite number of transactions based on my prices that leads to a sure 
loss for me. Otherwise we say that my assignments are coherent. It is well 
known that my assignments are coherent if and only if P is a probability 
measure. This is the justification that most Bayesians use for employing the 
calculus of probability. 
Now it is obvious that the betting scenario is intended as a metaphor. When I 
use probability theory, I do not seriously expect to be involved in betting 
games. Instead, the betting paradigm, and Savage's [20] more general frame- 
work, are ways of testing a theory of uncertainty to reveal flaws in the theory. 
If  my assessments based on P produce inconsistent betting behavior, than I 
cannot expect these probabilities to be useful for other, more complex pur- 
poses. This is a compelling argument for probability. 
One might argue that I don't always have enough evidence to choose a 
probability to represent my beliefs. I agree. (Here, I diverge from some 
subjectivists who insist that each individual has a probability waiting to be 
elicited.) But this misses the point. It is not that one always has a probability 
available. It is that to be coherent, one must use probability. As Shafer says, 
"Finding ways of using probabil i ty. . ,  when. . ,  frequencies are not available" 
is a difficult task. He is correct hat the normative arguments of de Finetti and 
Savage do not dispose of this task. On the other hand, the difficulties of this 
task do not imply that probability should be abandoned. The laws of physics 
impose serious practical problems for many engineering tasks. But that does 
not give us license to reject the laws of physics. 
I f  we use probability theory when frequency evidence is not available, we 
may have to use a probability measure that we are not completely confident in. 
In that case, we would be prudent o carry out a sensitivity analysis to see 
if our conclusions depend heavily on the assumed probability. For more 
on sensitivity analysis see Berger [21; 22, Sect. 4.7; 23], DeRobertis and 
Hartigan [24], Walley [25, 26], Wasserman [1, 2], and Wasserman and 
Kadane [27]. 
It is tempting to view the betting scenario as just an instance of a canonical 
example. If  that were the case, probability would be appropriate just when we 
judge this analogy to be appropriate. But the betting metaphor plays a different 
role than a canonical example. It serves as a way of testing the theory of 
probability to see if it makes sense. I would like belief functions to pass such a 
test. I would like to know that if I base actions on belief functions then I will 
not be led to uniformly poor actions. I am not suggesting that quantifying 
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uncertainty is the same as decision making. Rather, I am saying that investigat- 
ing the decisions that result from a particular theory of uncertainty is a way of 
exposing problems with that theory. Coherence is not the only, or best, test of 
a theory, but at least it is some sort of test. The bottom line is that belief 
functions would be more convincing if some notion of coherence could be 
developed that would justify the calculus of belief functions. 
4. FREQUENCIES VERSUS BELIEFS 
Shafer is careful to separate belief from frequency. This is in contradiction 
to a major success tory in Bayesian theory, namely, de Finetti's [16] theory 
of exchangeability. Here, frequency is subsumed as a special case of belief. 
De Finetti's theory says that if an observer egards an infinite sequence of 
observations as exchangeable, meaning that his beliefs about he sequence are 
invariant under finite permutations, then his uncertainty about that sequence is
mathematically equivalent to a mixture of independent, identically distributed 
observations. In particular, he will believe that the sequence has limiting 
proportions that can be discovered through repetition. In short, he will believe 
in frequencies. In other words, frequency is a special type of belief. Rather 
than relying on an analogy with frequencies, I see this as a definition of 
frequency probability--a definition that is far more practical and successful 
than attempts to define frequencies outside the realm of subjective probability. 
This is an important point, then: The Bayesian theory contains within it a 
definition of frequency probability and a description of the exact assump- 
tions necessary to invoke that definition. Seen this way, I think it is unfair to 
suggest that probability relies on an analogy with frequency. 
Shafer allows frequencies a life of their own; belief and frequency are 
separated. But then we are left without a definition of frequency probability. 
Apparently we are supposed to accept he canonical example of, say, drawing 
from a well-shaken urn, as a basic concept hat needs no formal definition. In 
Shafer [10, Sect. 3.3], the beginnings of a notion of exchangeability in the 
theory of belief functions were outlined. I wonder if Professor Shafer has 
pursued the details of this approach? If so, I think it would cast further light on 
the role of frequencies. 
5. THE ASYMPTOTICS OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS 
In a Bayesian problem, as one acquires more and more information, 
interesting things happen. Specifically, from Doob's [28] result, the posterior 
distribution converges, with probability 1, to the truth. Similarly, the differ- 
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ence between two observers' opinions tends to zero (Blackwell and Dubins 
[29]). Under mild conditions, the observers' beliefs converge to a Gaussian 
distribution (LeCam [30]). 
To my knowledge, not a great deal has been said about the asymptotics of 
belief functions. It would be useful to know what happens to Bel = Bel 1 
• .. • Bel n as n gets large. According to Eddy [31], only probability 
measures and a limited type of belief function are possible as limits. Are 
results on the asymptotic behavior of belief functions available that will help 
deepen our understanding of belief functions? 
6. CONVEX SETS OF PROBABILITIES 
Shafer points out that for a given belief function Bel, there is a closed, 
convex class of probability measures M such that BeI(A) is the lower bound 
of P(A) as P varies over M. But he correctly warns us that belief functions 
should not be interpreted as lower bounds on probabilities. I agree. Not only is 
this interpretation atodds with Dempster's rule, but it is easy to construct sets 
M whose lower bounds are not belief functions. 
I should mention that sets of probabilities may be justified by generalized 
betting arguments as in Walley [25, 26] and Williams [32]. Thus, it is not 
necessary to draw "an analogy between actual evidence and knowledge of 
bounds of unknown true probabilities" to find lower probabilities useful. 
I would like to point out that even if we are dealing with a single belief 
function, with no intention of combining that belief function with another, 
there is still a difference between belief functions and lower probabilities. For 
it is sometimes possible to find another closed, convex set of measures M '  that 
is strictly contained in M but whose lower bound is again Bel. Thus, to 
attempt to relate Bel and M leads to an ambiguity. I f  we were now to attempt 
to bound the expectation of a random variable X,  we would get a different 
answer depending on whether we used M or M'.  Further complications arise 
if we condition on an event. 
On the other hand, when a class of probability measures produces a lower 
bound that happens to be a belief function, this coincidence can be exploited. 
In Wasserman [1, 2] I show how this simplifies certain computations when 
doing sensitivity analysis in Bayesian inference. See Walley [25, 26] as well. 
The moral is that while it may be dangerous to interpret belief functions as 
lower bounds, it is fruitful to exploit the fact that lower bounds are sometimes 
belief functions. 
For other technical material about lower probabilities, I refer the reader to 
Good [33], Huber [34], Huber and Strassen [35], Suppes and Zanotti [36], 
Walley [25, 26], Williams [32], Koopman [37, 38], Wasserman and Kadane 
[27], and Fine [39]. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
Despite the complaints I have registered, I am glad that active interest in 
belief functions continues. In situations where belief functions are generated by 
consistency relations, they make sense. And, as I pointed out in Section 6, 
belief functions are interesting in robust Bayesian inference, even if their 
interpretation i that setting is not in line with the philosophical standpoint 
articulated by Shafer. 
Lindley [40] predicted a Bayesian 21st century for statistics. Will belief 
functions be in routine use in artificial intelligence by the 21st century? I would 
not venture a high belief on this event. Fortunately, belief functions are not 
additive, so I need not place a high belief against such a future. 
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